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Abstract
In an observational learning environment, rational agents with incomplete information
may mimic the actions of their predecessors even when their own signal suggests the
opposite. This herding behavior may lead society to an inefficient outcome if the signals
of the early movers happen to be incorrect. 
This paper analyzes the effect of signal accuracy on the probability of an
inefficient informational cascade. The literature so far has suggested  that an increase in
signal accuracy  leads to a decline in  the probability of inefficient herding, because the
first movers are more likely to make the correct choice. Indeed, the results in
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) support this proposition. Here we show that
this is not the case in general. We present simulations which demonstrate that even a
small departure from symmetry in signal accuracy may lead to non-monotonic results. An
increase in signal accuracy may result in a higher likelihood of an inefficient cascade.
Corresponding Author: 
Ivan Pastine, School of Economics, University College Dublin, Belfield Dublin 4,
Ireland. 
Email: Ivan.Pastine@ucd.ie
1In an informational cascade every subsequent agent makes the same choice
independent of his private signal. Therefore private information is no longer conveyed
to the market and social learning ceases.
While Banarjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) have a
predetermined sequence of moves in agents’ decisions, Chamley and Gale (1994)
endogenize the timing of moves and show that herding will eventually arise with
probability one, resulting in either a boom or a collapse.  
2There are a wide variety of markets where herding may arise. Among others, see
Avery and Zemsky (1998),  Chamley (2003), Chari and Kehoe (2003), Devenow and
Welch (1996),  Nelson (2002) and Scharfstein and Stein(1990) for analysis of herd
behavior in financial markets, Neeman and Orosel (1999) for analysis in auctions,
Morton and Williams (1999) for herding in a political economy framework and Choi,
Dassiou and Gettings (2000), Kennedy (2002) and De Vany and Lee (2001) for herding
among firms. 
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I. Introduction
Seminal papers by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and
Welch (1992) show that it may be optimal for a rational agent with incomplete
information to follow the actions of his predecessors even when his own private signal
suggests the opposite. In an observational learning environment this herding behavior
may lead society to common actions, possibly resulting in sudden booms and crashes. If
the early movers’ signals happen to be incorrect the followers will be mislead, yielding
an inefficient outcome. This paper analyzes the effect of signal accuracy on the
probability of an inefficient informational cascade.1
Herding may have dramatic consequences depending on the market we study2.
Herding in the labor market may result in a prolonged period of unemployment of an
individual if he initially turns out to be unlucky in a few job interviews. Herding among
portfolio managers may result in an inefficient allocation of pension fund assets. Herding
in R&D projects may result in delays in finding the cure for a fatal disease. In financial
markets a sudden crash can have severe macroeconomic consequences.
The analysis of the factors that affect the likelihood of an inefficient cascades may
be of interest in helping to reduce the probability of such events. For instance, the
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Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted in hopes
of preventing catastrophic crashes like Black Thursday in 1929. Among other regulations
these acts require periodic reporting of financial information concerning publically traded
securities in order to improve signal accuracy. Depending on the market under
consideration, signal accuracy may be affected by a variety of factors, such as changes
in accounting standards, technological advancement in information dissemination and
informative advertising. In this paper we would like to study the effects of an
improvement in signal accuracy on the probability of an inefficient cascade. 
The literature so far has suggested  that an increase in signal accuracy leads to a
decline in  the probability of inefficient herding because the first movers are more likely
to make the correct choice. Indeed, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992)
(henceforth BHW) clearly support this proposition. We show this not to be the case in
general.
In BHW the agent receives a signal about the true value of the project, either
good or bad. The signal is correct with probability p. Agents take the decision to invest
or not. In the BHW framework an increase in signal accuracy always leads to a decrease
in the probability of inefficient herding. In this paper, we consider the case where signals
do not have symmetric accuracy.
In general, the good signal and the bad signal do not necessarily need to be of the
same accuracy. For instance, a good job candidate may come to a job interview on time
with a 95 % probability and a bad candidate may be on time with an 85% probability. As
long as the probabilities are different, promptness may be a useful signal of candidate
quality. If the candidate is good, he will be prompt and send the good signal with a 95%
chance. The accuracy of the good signal is 95%. If the candidate is bad, he will be late
and send a bad signal with a 15% chance. The accuracy of the bad signal is 15%. In this
example the signals do not have symmetric accuracy.  In the symmetric case, one forces
3Vives (1996) shows that a framework to help explain the observation of
incorrect herds in a social learning setting needs to have two ingredients: Indivisibilities
in terms of the discrete action space and signals of bounded precision.   
4See Pastine (2005) for the effects of signal accuracy in an endogenous-timing
framework. See Smith and Sørensen (1999) for a model which generates herding without
the perfect observability assumption. 
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the probability of the bad candidate sending the correct signal (hence being late ) to be
95%, which is quite restrictive. We show that even small departures from symmetry may
lead to non-monotonic results. In some cases an increase in signal accuracy may result
in a higher likelihood of an inefficient cascade.
II. Symmetric Signal Accuracy
In BHW the value of the project is either high or low with even prior probabilities. The
gain to adopting is either 1 in the High (H) state or 0 in the Low (L) state and the cost of
adopting is ½ . Each risk-neutral agent receives a private conditionally independent signal
about the value of the investment project. An individual’s signal is either h or R. The
signal is correct with probability p. For presentation purposes it will be convenient to add
½ to each of these payoffs, converting the BHW problem into an equivalent payoff
matrix. The agent faces two investment projects:3 The risky project yields either 1 in the
High state or 0 in the Low state. The safe project yields a safe return of ½ in either state.
The payoff matrix is then given by:
      Table 1
Risky
Project
Safe
Project
High State 1  ½ 
Low State 0  ½ 
ex ante Prob(High)=0.5
If the risky project  is rejected, the safe project is adopted. There is a predetermined
sequence moves and agents observe the actions of those ahead of them4. Agents follow
5In laboratory experiments Anderson and Holt (1997) find that in situations where
the subject is theoretically indifferent he typically goes with his own signal rather than
randomizing. We have also run all the simulations under this assumption and the results
we discuss are qualitatively unchanged.
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Bayes’ Rule in their learning process. Following BHW, when an agent is indifferent
between the two projects he is assumed to randomize, choosing each project with 50%
probability.5
The above described scenario is equivalent to the following: There are two urns;
H and L. Each urn has some balls marked h and some balls marked R. Urn L has a higher
percentage of balls marked R than urn H. In the BHW framework the percentile of correct
balls in each urn, the signal accuracy p, is symmetric. That is, the percentage of h balls
in the H urn is equal to the percentage of R balls in the L urn. Nature draws one urn with
equal probabilities. Then all agents privately draw one ball each with replacement from
the same urn.
The agent’s problem is to determine which urn the ball comes from. The early
movers’ actions will reflect their private information, allowing followers to infer their
private signal. At some point this public information will overwhelm the informational
content of a single private agent. After that point all following agents will take the same
action regardless of their private signals. The probabilistic nature of the individual signals
implies that incorrect cascade may form. If most of the early agents happened to receive
an  R signal, all newcomers may choose Urn L even when the correct Urn is H. In other
words, the society may settle on the safe project even though the true value of the risky
project is high. The probability of an L cascade when the true state is H is referred to as
the probability of an inefficient negative cascade. Likewise, the society may settle in the
risky project even though the true value of the risky project is low. The probability of an
H cascade when the true state is L is referred to as the probability of an inefficient
positive cascade. The inefficient cascade probability is simply given by the inefficient
6In BHW there is a closed-form solution for the probability of inefficient cascades
due to the recursive nature of the symmetric signal accuracy framework. When we depart
from symmetry the recursive nature breaks down.  All simulations in the paper are done
with 10 million runs per data point. In all cases the 99% confidence intervals are less than
the width of the symbols used to represent data points. We have created a Windows
program which can be used to easily simulate a wide variety of BHW-based herding
models. The software is self contained, requiring no additional programs, and can be
downloaded from: 
http://www.ucd.ie/economic/staff/ipastine/herding.htm 
- 5 -
positive cascade probability and the inefficient negative cascade probability weighted by
the ex ante probabilities of states H and L. 
Figure 1 summarizes our replication of BHW’s results on signal accuracy.6 An
increase in signal accuracy always leads to a decrease in the probability of inefficient
herding since the early movers are more likely to take the correct action.
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Figure 1
We aim to show that this monotonicity result is not general. Even a small
departure away from symmetry may lead to the violation of this result. The BHW
framework is symmetric because: i) The signal has the same accuracy in both states.
There are exactly the same percentile of correct balls in each urn. ii) The ex ante
probabilities of high and low project values are even.
It will be useful to notice that here the probability of an inefficient cascade is
equal to the probability of an inefficient positive cascade. It is also equal to the
probability of an inefficient negative cascade. This is due to the symmetry of the
framework.
7To the best of our knowledge, the first examination of asymmetric signal
accuracies in a herding context was the laboratory experiments of Anderson and Holt
(1997).
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III. Asymmetric Signal Accuracy
In the urn setting, asymmetric signal accuracy translates into asymmetric percentile of
correct balls in each urn.7 ph refers to the percentile of h balls in Urn H. It is equal to the
probability of receiving signal h conditional on H, Prob(h|H). pR refers to the percentile
of R balls in Urn L. It is equal to the probability of receiving signal R conditional on L,
Prob(R|L). For the signals to be informative it must be the case that pR 1-ph. By
appropriately labeling the signals pR+ph>1 without loss of generality.
3.1. Even State Probabilities
Figure 2 reports the simulation results for signal accuracy of h fixed at 70% and
varying the accuracy of signal R. Fixing the accuracy of the h signal at different levels
does not change the spirit of the results.  The payoff matrix and the ex ante probabilities
of states H and L are as in Table 1.
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Figure 2
Figure 2 reports simulation results right around the point of symmetry. The three
plots in the graph are the probability of a inefficient positive cascade (“Prob. H when L”),
the probability of a inefficient negative cascade (“Prob. L when H”) and the ex ante
probability of an inefficient cascade (“Prob. Inefficient”) which is the average of the two
former weighted by the ex ante probabilities of the states. 
In this example, the probability of an inefficient cascade is monotonic in signal
accuracy. However, the probability of an inefficient positive cascade is not monotonic.
The probability of an H cascade when the true state is L decreases with an improvement
in signal accuracy until the point of symmetry. But then it jumps up  from 0.12 to 0.38.
It then continues to decrease with an increase in accuracy. The probability of an L
8The less accurate signal has a higher weight in the updating process. Staring out
with even ex ante probabilities, when an agent receives signal h, he  updates his belief
that the project value is high from 0.5 to Prob(H|h)=ph/(1+ph-pR).When the agent receives
signal R, he updates his belief that the project value is low from 0.5 to Prob(L|R)= pR/(1+pR-
ph). As long as pR<ph, Prob(L|R)> Prob(H|h). 
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cascade when the true state is H also shows jumpy behavior. At the point of symmetry
it drops down from 0.38 to 0.12. 
To understand what lies behind the jumps in the positive and negative inefficient
cascade probabilities around the point of symmetry first notice the following: When ph
and pR are symmetric, the second agent will either go with his own signal or he will be just
indifferent between the two actions. The first mover will follow his own signal, so the
second agent will be able to infer his signal from his action. If the first and second signals
are different, the second signal simply cancels out the first since they have equal
accuracy. When there is asymmetry, however slight, signal h and signal R do not cancel
each other out because they have different weights in the updating process. Therefore
herding can start earlier when signal accuracies are not symmetric.   
When pR is just below ph, the second agent always herds when the first agent
chooses L.8 Hence the probability of an inefficient L cascade is high. When pR is just
above ph, the second agent always herds when the first agent chooses H. Hence the
probability of an inefficient H cascade is high. Right at the point of symmetry the
negative and positive cascade probabilities are equal. Hence, we observe the inefficient
positive cascade probability jumping up and the inefficient negative cascade  probability
jumping down. 
Numerically, examine the case where the signal accuracy of R is just below the
signal accuracy of h, ph=0.7 and pR=0.699. If the first mover chooses the risky investment,
indicating that he has received signal h,  the second agent will follow his own signal. He
will choose the risky project if he receives signal h and he will choose the safe project if
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he receives signal R. This is because the probability that the true value of the risky project
is low conditional on an h signal and then an R signal is greater than 0.5, it is given by:
where
However if the first agent picks L, the second agent will already herd. He will choose the
safe project even if he receives signal h.  The probability that the true value of the risky
project is high conditional on an R signal and then an h signal is less than 0.5. It is given
by:
where
When the accuracy of R falls below the accuracy of h, the second agent mimics the first
mover if the first mover picks L. He does not go against his own signal if the first mover
picks H. Therefore the probability of an incorrect L cascade is high.   
When the signal accuracy of R is just above the signal accuracy of h,  ph =0.7 and
pR=7.001, we have the opposite situation.  If the first mover chooses the safe investment,
the second agent will follow his own signal. However if the first agent picks H, the
second agent will choose the risky project even if he receives signal R. The probability
that the true value of the risky project is high conditional on an h and then an R signal is
0.5004778. A positive information cascade starts right away with the second agent if the
first agent receives signal h. Therefore the probability of an incorrect H cascade is high.
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At the point of symmetry, the probability of an incorrect H cascade is equal to the
probability of an incorrect L cascade. This is why we observe the jumps in Figure 2.
While our primary purpose here is to analyze the ex ante probability of an
inefficient cascade, it is worth noting that in many markets the interest is in the
probability of either inefficient positive or negative cascades. In many situations analyzed
using herding models there are important externalities from the market to society at large.
Bank panics, capital flight and stock market crashes have external consequences which
may induce a social planner to place a greater weight on inefficient negative cascades
rather than on inefficient positive cascades. In other markets the party designing the
structure of the market may not have an incentive to weigh all market participants
equally. In the IPO market, for example, the features of the market are not controlled by
a central planner, but rather by the firms offering companies for public sale. These
companies may try to increase the probability of an H outcome, whether efficient or not.
3.2. Inefficient Cascade Probability
We have now established the main building blocks for understanding why an increase in
signal accuracy can lead to an increase in the probability of inefficient herding. Since the
inefficient cascade probability is given by the inefficient positive cascade probability and
the inefficient negative cascade probability weighted by the ex ante probabilities of state
H and state L, the inefficient cascade probability itself may be non-monotonic in signal
accuracy when we have uneven ex ante probabilities.  Here is a new payoff matrix:
Table 2
Risky
Project
Safe
Project
High State 2  1/2
Low State 0  1/2
ex ante Prob(High)= 0.25
The expected value from the risky project is still equal to the expected value from the
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Figure 3
safe project. But now the risky project is riskier than before. If we constrain the accuracy
of signal h to be equal to the accuracy of signal R, we still get the same monotonicity
result as in BHW with equal negative and positive incorrect cascade probabilities. Now
let us fix the signal accuracy of h, but vary the signal accuracy of R. Figure 3 summarizes
the simulation results for ph=0.7. Once again, fixing the accuracy of the h signal at other
levels does not change the qualitative results. 
The probability of an inefficient cascade is clearly non-monotonic in signal
accuracy. It jumps up at three levels of signal accuracy: At the 0.505 level, at 0.7 (the
point of symmetry), and at the 0.9275 level. Before explaining the particularities of these
levels of accuracy, let us gain some intuition into the  jaggedness of the plots. The non-
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monotonicity of the probabilities presents itself as plots with sudden jumps up and down
rather than as differentiable graphs. This is due to the binary nature of the problem the
agent faces. The agent decides whether to follow his own signal or to go against his own
signal. As the signal accuracy improves in a continuous scale the expected value of each
of these options changes continuously, but the agent’s decision switches from one to the
other in a discrete jump.
At the point of symmetry we have the same incentives as in the previous case.
However, since the ex ante probability of L is now 0.75, the positive cascade probability
has a higher weight in the ex ante inefficient cascade probability. At the point of
symmetry the probability of an inefficient cascade jumps up from 0.18 to 0.30.
  Let’s now examine the jump at 0.505. Set signal pR at 0.5 – just below 0.505.
Imagine four agents in the following sequence of actions: H,L,H,H. At this level of signal
accuracy none of these agents herd. Their actions do reflect their private signals. Having
observed this sequence, it is optimal for the fifth agent not to herd. He will follow his
own signal. But when we set the accuracy at 0.51 – just above 0.505 – having observed
the same sequence (and once again at this level of accuracy the actions of the four agents
do reflect their private signals) it is optimal for the fifth agent to herd to H. Therefore, just
past the 0.505 level, the probability of an inefficient H cascade jumps up. And the
probability of an inefficient L cascade jumps down. The weighted average, the probability
of an inefficient cascade, jumps up from 0.32 to 0.335. There are of course many
alternative sequences of signals one can observe before herding starts. The discontinuities
in the probabilities arise at points where small changes in parameters switch agents in
some sequence from one action to the other. The size of the discontinuity is then related
9This suggests that the results would be stronger in models where there are
relatively few pre-herding sequences that arise in practice. This feature is typical of
models with exogenous timing. Typically in models with endogenous timing, such as
Chamley and Gale (1994), large numbers of agents invest before herding commences so
the likelihood of any particular sequence of decisions will be small. Nevertheless, Pastine
(2005) shows that similar non-monotonicty results can arise in these frameworks as well.
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to the likelihood of that sequence.9    
The third jump up in the probability of an inefficient cascade is at the accuracy
level 0.927. Imagine the first two agents take the sequence of actions: L,L (with these
parameters one could infer their private signals from their actions). The third agent will
go with his own signal if the signal accuracy of R is just above 0.927. But he will herd to
L if the accuracy is just below 0.927. Hence as the signal accuracy improves from 0.927,
the probability of an incorrect L cascade jumps down. At the same time the probability
of an incorrect H cascades jumps up. The net effect on the  probability of an inefficient
cascade is a jump up.   
3.3. Changing Both Signal Accuracies
One can also analyze the effect of increasing the accuracy of the signal in both the good
and the bad states at the same time. This would be in the same spirit as the analysis
performed in BHW where there is a single parameter which represents both signal
accuracies, and hence they both changed together. As always, in the symmetric case the
effect of an increase in signal accuracy on the probability of an inefficient cascade is
negative. However, for an asymmetric model this is not always the case. Figure 4 gives
the simulation results for payoff Table 2, where initially there are asymmetric signal
accuracies of ph=0.5 and pR = 0.8 and then both accuracies are changed together. 
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Figure 4
The probability of an inefficient cascade jumps up from 0.23 to 0.28 as the signal
accuracy of both signals increase past ph=0.504 and pl = 0.804. The possibility of an
increase in the probability of an inefficient cascade due to an increase in signal accuracy
is not an artifact of increasing the accuracy of only one signal. With asymmetry, when the
accuracy of both signals are increased as in BHW, the monotonicity of the probability of
an inefficient cascade may break down.
3.4. An Example and Intuition
Let us give an example from the labor market. There is a job vacancy. The safe
alternative is to hire an adjunct professor with a payoff of ½. The risky alternative is to
10See Hung and Plott (2001) for information cascades in sequential voting. 
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hire a tenure-track professor with either a 2 or a 0 payoff (as in Table 2). The candidate
for the tenure-track position presents himself in private office meetings to each of the
hiring committee members (each committee member draws one signal from the same
urn). Committee members then vote sequentially with their hiring decisions.10
A good job candidate has a high probability of successfully presenting himself in
an office meeting. A bad candidate has a lower probability of successfully presenting
himself. Now imagine that graduate schools stop training bad candidates for  presentation
skills. This new policy leads to a decline in the probability of bad candidates successfully
presenting themselves (the accuracy of the bad signal goes up). Nevertheless, this might
lead to an increase in the probability of the bad candidate getting the job due to an
inefficient positive cascade within the hiring committee. See Figure 3 for ph fixed and pR
varying. An increase in pR can lead to an increase in the probability of an inefficient
positive cascade (hiring a bad candidate).
There are two forces at work. When schools stop training bad candidates for
presentation skills, the informational value of a good presentation goes up. Of course
observing a good presentation by a bad candidate is now less likely. But if the first
committee member to speak happens to have seen a good presentation, herding may start
early since all following voters would put more informational weight on that good report.
This leads to the increase in the probability of hiring a bad candidate. The second effect
may overwhelm the first depending on the initial levels of signal accuracy. 
IV. Conclusion
In a social learning environment, herding may lead society to settle in an inefficient
alternative. A social planner would like to reduce the probability of an inefficient
outcome, such as the collapse of financial markets, misallocation of pension funds, or the
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widespread adoption of dubious medical practices. In some cases the designer of the
system might be on one side of the market. In an IPO market the seller would be
interested in reducing the probability of a negative cascade. A firm introducing a new
technology would like to induce a positive cascade, even if the technology is not a
superior alternative. It is therefore useful to understand how social policy or private
agents may to be able to manipulate herds. This paper is an effort toward learning more
about how to influence the probabilistic outcome of social learning.
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